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Anthropology? The Boasian Revolution and Culture as Unique Phenomenon In this paper I want to address what anthropology
became as the Boasian revolution developed in order to examine the
question “What is anthropology?” Kroeber, Mead, Redfield, Kluckhohn
and Hatch each develop key approaches to examine the implications
of Boas’ anthropological observations that culture(s) is (are) unique
and shaped by history, plural, holistic, behaviorally determined and
relativistic. In this paper I want to examine the way these Boasian
perspectives manifest themselves in the work of each author. Like
Boas, Kroeber argues that culture is a unique (sui generis)
phenomenon that must be understood on its own principles. Over the
course of his career, Kroeber attempted to identify these characteristics
employing, in part, a dualistic framework, which served to clarify
aspects of the study of culture. Mead called, in some of her writings,
for a more in depth, somewhat systematic, ethnographic approach. Redfield
emphasized the role of culture change over time in understanding syncretism
(the blending of different systems of belief and practices). Kluckhohn
looked at manifest and latent functions of witchcraft in a culture
as a whole. Hatch philosophically questions the implicit assumption
that cultural relativity entails ethical relativity. I want to argue
that the role of anthropological language as articulated by the authors
above, and others, distinguishes anthropology from other disciplines
and makes it unique as a discipline. I also want to suggest that an
examination of a culture’s language provides a unit of analysis, which
might undergird and make more precise and analytical the study of
culture. Kroeber elaborates on the Boasian culture concept by dualistically
distinguishing approaches to its study - as well as categories or
aspects of culture. Like Boas, Kroeber suggested that anthropology
draws from both scientific and historical approaches. Scientifically,
two kinds of approaches can be used to study phenomena: generalizing
and analytic.[1]
Analytic approaches attempt to decompose or analyze things or events
into their constituent processes; generalizing approaches attempt
to arrive at formulations, which have application to phenomena beyond
those, which are under investigation. Generalizing approaches seek
findings, which are “independent of specific or particular time and
place.”[2] Kroeber ultimately
saw futility in generalizing approaches to phenomena, anthropologically
observed. But both seem to be lacking in Kroeber’s work. Kroeber also identified
two approaches for examining anthropological data: diachronic and
synchronic. A diachronic approach to understanding groups of people
seeks to understand how events, traits, behavior, myths, language
and traditions evolve through time, i.e. historically. A synchronic
approach focuses on the way these interactions of traits, behaviors,
myths, and language play out in the functioning of the group in the
present, disregarding history. Kroeber also dualistically
identified cultures as having primary and secondary features. Primary
features include approaches to subsistence or reality; Kroeber called
this aspect of cultural life ‘basic culture.’ By contrast, secondary
features, for Kroeber, referred to creativity, play, experimentation,
and particularly intellectual creativity or value. Kroeber speaks
of value culture as “embodying expressions or sublimations of play
impulses;”[3] he refers to it as
involving “a very strong latent impulse toward cultural play, innovation,
and experiment, a true originality and inventiveness” in man.[4]
Implicit in this dualistic operation is a hierarchical understanding,
that ‘value’ cultures – those with more creativity and play - are
superior to those cultures more oriented to subsistence. “Value” culture
is often considered one of Kroeber’s main contributions to anthropology. For a while, Kroeber
also identified culture as superorganic, a “substance” which is irreducible
to the individual level, juxtaposing the individual with culture,
but later altered this perspective.[5] Utilizing dualisms
with which to examine culture, Kroeber helped to develop a series
of discriminatory frameworks, not necessarily analytical, as well
as a language of anthropology. What his use of a dualistic approach
also seems to suggest, however, is a predisposition to either/or or
binary categories. This perspective seems to situate the understanding
of human behavior in a number of key areas he identifies but which
doesn’t leave open other more complex situations or ways of understanding
or analyses, such as would an analysis of language. Thus Kroeber’s
approach seems to discriminate more than analyze. In The Role
of Style in Comparative Civilizations Kroeber suggests that reflexively
examining style – which for him was a pattern or way of doing things
- is a useful way to look at the concept of civilizations as a whole;
he thus implicitly suggests a kind of essentializing of culture,
an expression of Boas’ work. Later in the article, he argues that
thinking about civilization ‘styles’ involves discrimination, but
not analyses. One could argue that this criticism which Kroeber levels
at thinking about styles, could be what he himself did in the body
of his writings, as well as what anthropology does in general. If
analysis is defined as dividing something into its elemental parts
or basic principles -- or reasoning or acting from a perception of
the parts and interrelations of a subject - and culture(s) is (are)
shaped by history, plural, holistic, behaviorally determined and relativistic,
an analysis of it (them) might seem to suggest a need for basic units
or analytical principles, which Kroeber doesn’t seem to provide. Examining
behavior, especially language as behavior, as the basic units of analysis
would offer a basis for an analytical approach. In terms of behavior, etc. – Boas’ emphasis on ‘traits’
- Mead suggests that to go into more rigor, one needs to spend more
time in a community and master it in detail, i.e. “residence, interrelationships,
names, clan affiliations, economic status, and past, existent and
projected marriages must be got by heart.” In addition, she suggests
that a specialized knowledge of every individual is needed. While
further refining some of the implications of the Boasian revolution,
she doesn’t seem to emphasize a systematic, analytic approach. Redfield takes
the Boasian focus on history into account by identifying the
importance of a diachronic perspective in looking at culture change.
He develops the idea of syncretism to explain how cultural features
from very different cultures interact to form new ones. Kluckhohn introduces
a psychological perspective to examine the way Navaho culture as
a whole regulate things such as hostile behavior through witchcraft
as expressions of ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ functions. Hatch examines
the philosophical implications of cultural relativism
to question whether cultural relativism entails ethical relativism,
in “The Call for Tolerance.” Boas’ culture concept
profoundly impacted a generation of seminal anthropologists and their
work. While the culture concept - as shaped by history, as plural,
holistic, behaviorally determined and relativistic continued - seemed
to remain as a tool / idea discriminatory, rather than analytic, its
incorporation in the anthropological community generated a wealth
of information. But many analytic questions remain. For example at
what level are anthropologists examining the data – the meme level,[6] the behavior level,
the language level, the phonemic or phonetic level, etc? What’s the
unit of analysis of the data? Why does there seem to be a level of
imprecision in anthropological writings inconsistent with other social
sciences? Logically, anthropology
as outlined in this paper doesn’t easily differentiate itself from
other academic disciplines or approaches - writers of many persuasions
observe complex interactive human data - and it’s difficult to therefore
say what anthropology is. But anthropological language seems to be
both what characterizes what anthropology is as well as – because
words are some of the key tools of culture(s) - the study of which
provides a useful unit or level of analysis. Ultimately, however,
vis a vis Wittgenstein, anthropology, like philosophy, may seek the
clarification of thought, by "battling against the bewitchment
of our intelligence by means of language"[7]
first understood through language, then thought. References Dawkins,
Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford. Hatch,
Elvin. 1973. Theories of Man and Culture. N.Y., Columbia Kluckhohn,
Clyde. 1944. “Navaho Witchcraft as providing Culturally Defined Adaptive
and Adjustive Responses.” In Navaho Witchcraft. Boston, Beacon
Press Kroeber,
A.L. 1966. “The Role of Style in Comparative Civilizations.” In An
Anthropologist Looks at History, Berkeley, University of California
Press, pp. 66-89. Mead,
Margaret. 1933. “More Comprehensive Field Methods.” American Anthropologist,
35:1-15. Redfield,
Robert. 1934. “Culture Changes in Yucatan.” American Anthropologist,
36 :57-69. Wittgenstein,
Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. |